FALLHOOD
☢ MONEY MARKETROBINHOOD CHAINTESTNET

Yield fromthe toxic

Blue-chip lending markets list a dozen assets and refuse the rest. We take the rest. Every radioactive asset gets sealed in its own barrel — its own oracle, its own caps, its own liquidations — so a loss in one cannot reach another.

Isolation limits contagion. It does not eliminate your loss on a given barrel. Figures on this page are testnet simulations, not returns.

0
Barrels live
$0.00M
Sealed value
0
Assets rejected
0.00%
Cross-barrel loss
00 — The problem

Most of on-chain value is unusable

Aave lists a few dozen assets. Everything else — the long tail, the majority of what actually exists on-chain — sits idle, because one bad listing can create bad debt that spreads to the whole pool. So nobody lists it. Rationally.

Our bet is narrow and testable: you can safely accept toxic collateral if you isolate it completely.

REFUSED BY MAINSTREAM MARKETS —
MEME PERP LPMICRO-CAP GOVERNANCEVESTED AIRDROP CLAIMSINGLE-SIDED FARM RECEIPTLOW-FLOAT L2 TOKENEXOTIC OPTIONS VAULTREBASING STABLENFT FLOOR PERPILLIQUID RWA NOTEGAME CURRENCYMEME PERP LPMICRO-CAP GOVERNANCEVESTED AIRDROP CLAIMSINGLE-SIDED FARM RECEIPTLOW-FLOAT L2 TOKENEXOTIC OPTIONS VAULTREBASING STABLENFT FLOOR PERPILLIQUID RWA NOTEGAME CURRENCY
GAME CURRENCYILLIQUID RWA NOTENFT FLOOR PERPREBASING STABLEEXOTIC OPTIONS VAULTLOW-FLOAT L2 TOKENSINGLE-SIDED FARM RECEIPTVESTED AIRDROP CLAIMMICRO-CAP GOVERNANCEMEME PERP LPGAME CURRENCYILLIQUID RWA NOTENFT FLOOR PERPREBASING STABLEEXOTIC OPTIONS VAULTLOW-FLOAT L2 TOKENSINGLE-SIDED FARM RECEIPTVESTED AIRDROP CLAIMMICRO-CAP GOVERNANCEMEME PERP LP
01 — The invariant

A leak in one barrel stays in that barrel

This is the whole product, and it is a mathematical claim, not a marketing one: if any code path can socialise a barrel's loss beyond that barrel, we treat it as a bug.

LOADING SIMULATION…
Rendered live in your browser with Remotion — frame 000 / 300
01

One asset, one barrel

Each market is a single collateral / borrow pair with its own oracle, LTV, liquidation threshold, caps and rate model. Nothing is shared. There is no pooled reserve to drain.

02

Losses stop at the wall

If liquidation proceeds fall short, the shortfall is absorbed by that barrel's backstop and its lenders. It never reaches another barrel, and never reaches the treasury.

03

No asset earns an exception

Tiering changes parameters, never isolation. The tamest collateral we hold is sealed exactly as hard as the worst one.

02 — The inventory

Four barrels open

Six assets have been through the listing process. Four are live, one waits on an oracle we can trust, and one is sealed permanently. That ratio is the point.

☢ Testnet simulation. Rates and balances shown are illustrative and are not an offer, a forecast, or a promise of return. Supplying to any barrel risks the full loss of your deposit.

03 — The economics

The Overflow is money that was actually paid

A barrel produces revenue from three places. Once lenders are made whole, the surplus — the Overflow — goes to the people who carried the risk: the backstoppers staked against that specific barrel, and $FLLT stakers.

Borrow interest

The hazard premium. Toxic collateral borrows at a rate that pays lenders for holding real risk.

Liquidation revenue

Liquidation bonuses paid by borrowers who let a position drift, collected inside the barrel.

Protocol fees

A cut of the above, swept per barrel. Nothing is minted. Nothing is subsidised.

0%

of distributions are paid in the borrow asset. We will not print $FLLT and call it yield. If a barrel earns nothing this week, it distributes nothing this week — and the dashboard will say so.

04 — Hazard tiers

How toxic it is sets the price of the risk

T1

SEMI-LIQUID

Real depth, boring price action, an oracle nobody argues about. It still gets a sealed barrel, because tiering is not trust.

Max LTV
55–65%
Hazard premium
+0 to 3%
T2 / T3

VOLATILE / EXOTIC

Thin books, weird price surfaces, LP positions priced from their legs. Tight caps, fast liquidations, a backstop that gets paid to be there.

Max LTV
28–45%
Hazard premium
+8 to 25%
T4

CRITICAL

The stuff every other market refuses outright. Micro caps. If it goes, it goes fast — and it goes alone, inside its own barrel.

Max LTV
≤ 20%
Hazard premium
+25% and up
OPERATIONS LOG — TESTNET
UTC
05 — Who decides

Someone has to say no

Barrels are curated, not permissionless — for now. Three operators sign off on every listing, every parameter and every oracle. Rejections are published alongside listings.

OPERATOR-01
Risk & listing
My job is mostly saying no. I have rejected four assets for every one that got a barrel, and the rejections are the part I am proud of.
OPERATOR-02
Oracles & feeds
A barrel is exactly as safe as its price feed. If I cannot break the feed in a simulation, it ships. If I can, the asset waits — however good the yield looks.
OPERATOR-03
Liquidations & backstop
We model who actually shows up to buy the collateral at 3am on a red day. If the answer is nobody, the cap goes down until the answer changes.
06 — Protocol sequence

Start small. Stay auditable.

01IN PROGRESS

PROVE CONTAINMENT

  • 1–2 isolated barrels, one semi-liquid collateral, USDC borrow
  • One robust oracle, conservative params, working liquidations
  • Isolation invariant proven end-to-end on testnet
  • No token. No backstop. Nothing to distract from the invariant.
02NEXT

REAL YIELD

  • Backstop staking, per barrel, opt-in, clearly priced
  • Fee capture and the Overflow distributor
  • Geiger risk score shipped on-chain and in the UI
  • Every distribution paid in the borrow asset. Never in our own token.
03LATER

GOVERNANCE

  • $FLLT launch and curated barrel creation
  • Governance over listings, params, hazard tiers, oracle choices
  • Staking tiers and priority access to new barrels
  • Path toward permissionless barrels, gated on the risk framework holding
07 — Read this part

Toxic collateral is high risk. Plainly.

You can lose everything you put in a barrel

Isolation caps how far a loss travels. It does not cap your loss. If a barrel takes bad debt beyond its backstop, its lenders absorb the rest.

Thin markets can be manipulated

Oracle manipulation is the number one attack on any money market, and it is worst exactly where we operate. We use robust feeds, TWAPs, staleness and deviation breakers — and we refuse assets we cannot price safely.

Illiquid collateral may not find a buyer

If nobody bids at liquidation, the barrel eats the difference. That is why caps are small, why liquidations fire early, and why the backstop exists.

This is unaudited, pre-launch software

Nothing here is live on mainnet. Nothing here is an offer, an invitation, or financial advice. Smart contracts fail; assume this one can too.